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‘Development’ is one of those zombie categories that have long since decayed, but still 
wander around resembling a worn-out 
utopia. Apparently buried long ago, the 
concept’s ghost is still haunting world 
politics. Despite the huge upheavals in 
world affairs recently, all of a sudden 
development appears to have made a 
comeback. 
The new breed of authoritarian 
leaders are now enthusiastic about devel-
opment, for example. Yet, with the rise 
of national populism, the idea of  devel-
opment no longer plays an inspiring, 
forward-looking role, as it did in the days 
when nation-states were being decolo-
nized and even at the time of deregula-
tion of global markets. The Trumps and 
the Bolsonaros, the Erdoğans and Modis 
of this world still believe in development, 
in so far as that means large projects, 
mass purchasing power and unregulated 
movements for corporations. But, besides 
being authoritarian and xenophobic, they 
are declared enemies of the environment. 
They promise their followers a roll-back 
of environmental politics; in fact, they 
are great fans of the brown economy, 
rejecting a green alternative. Their image 
of development is shaped by fossil energy 
and, more generally, extractivism of 
natural resources. National populists are 
nostalgic for the Industrial Age; they are 
not orientated to the future, but rather to 
the past.
However, there is a crucial discon-
tinuity in the development agenda of 
national populists: they are ethnocen-
tric and selfish. From the Second World 
War until very recently, development, 
for better or worse, was always conceived 
as being within the framework of multi-
lateralism. But with the inauguration of 
Donald Trump as US president, the wind 
has turned. ‘America First’ is the battle 
cry of unilateralism. The interests of 
one’s nation are of primary importance, 
while those of others are negligible. 
Trump’s echo resounds, for example, 
through Matteo Salvini, recently the 
strong man of Italy: ‘Primi gli italiani’ 
(First, the Italians) justified his denying 
entry for refugees in distress at sea. 
In other words, far from the Age of 
Development having long since come 
to an inglorious end, as people like me 
once claimed, the zombie term devel-
opment continues to make all kinds of 
mischief. And yet it is true that efforts are 
being made all around the world to base 
technology more on nature, the economy 
on the common good, and culture on 
civilizational diversity; all of which are 
objectives that can be understood in post-
development terms.
A claim too far
We were naive and a little pompous to 
proclaim the ‘end of the development 
age’. In the fall of 1988 at Pennsylvania 
State University, in the house of Barbara 
Duden, our group of friends began to 
draw up the outline of  what became the 
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of which I outlined in a theme issue of 
New Internationalist in 1992 called ‘Devel-
opment: a guide to the ruins’. On the 
track of Ivan Illich, who once had the 
plan to write an ‘archaeology of modern 
certainties’, we wanted to explore the key 
concept of development, which, as we 
said then, stood as a ruin in the intellec-
tual landscape. 
Let’s remember: in the second half of 
the 20th century the notion of develop-
ment stood like a mighty ruler over the 
nations of the southern hemisphere. It 
was the rallying cry of the postcolonial 
era. The concept seemed to be innocent, 
but in the long run it turned out to be 
detrimental; as a kind of mental infra-
structure, it paved the way for the 
imperial power of the West over the world. 
As things were in the West, so also should 
they be on Earth: that was, in short, the 
message of development.2
When did the development age begin? 
In our Development Dictionary, we focused 
on President Harry S Truman’s inaugural 
address to the US Congress on 20 January 
1949, in which he labelled the homes of 
more than half of the world’s population 
as ‘underdeveloped areas’. The develop-
ment age was opened with this speech – 
the period of world history that followed 
the colonial age of the European powers. 
The development age lasted about 40 
years and was replaced by the era of 
globalization. And presently there is 
another turning point: the rise of national 
populism.
What constitutes the idea of develop-
ment? Consider four aspects. Chrono-
politically, all nations seem to advance 
in the same direction. Imagine time is 
linear, moving only forwards or back-
wards; but the aim of technical and 
economic progress is forever fleeting. 
Geopolitically, the leaders of this path, 
the developed nations, show the strag-
gling countries which way to go. The 
bewildering variety of peoples in the 
world is now ranked simplistically as 
rich and poor nations. Socio-politically, 
the development of a nation is meas-
ured through its economic performance, 
according to gross domestic product 
(GDP). Societies that have just emerged 
from colonial rule are required to 
place themselves in the custody of ‘the 
economy’. And finally, the actors who 
push for development are mainly experts 
from governments, transnational banks 
and corporations. Previously, in Marx’s 
or Schumpeter’s time, ‘develop’ was 
used as an intransitive verb, like a flower 
that seeks maturity. Now the term is 
used transitively, as an active reorder-
ing of society that needs to be completed 
within decades, if not years.
What has become of this idea? To put 
it briefly, the notion took a direction that 
is not uncommon in the history of ideas: 
what once was a historical innovation 
became a convention over time, one that 
would end in general frustration. None-
theless, 30 years ago it was premature to 
claim the end of the developmental age, 
because disenchantment with the devel-
opment idea took place over decades – 
and is still not complete today. 
Ideas that become powerful in history 
do not disappear at once, but rather fade 
gradually as they become increasingly 
irrelevant to our understanding of the 
times. All the same, the tide has turned: 
even development experts are in a fog 
about the future, being mostly preoccu-
pied with limiting the social and ecologi-
cal catastrophes caused by the dominant 
development model. To impeach the 
development idea has become acceptable. 
But let us not jump ahead.
From the end of the Second World 
War, the discourse on development was 
framed in terms of the nation-state. 
Practically every young nation saw its 
raison d’ être as lying in development. But 
in November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell, 
the Cold War came to an end, and the 
era of globalization began. 
In the succeeding years the develop-
ment idea received a further boost. The 
development mentality spread to the 
ends of the earth, involving entirely new 
players. However, the nation-state had 
become porous, like a container riddled 
with bullet holes from external forces. 
Nation-states had to submit to global 
powers, both economic and cultural. 
Goods, money, information, images and 
people poured across borders, creating a 
transnational social space where inter-
actions take place over great distances, 
sometimes even in real time. 
In this process, other actors, such as 
transnational corporations and media, 
played an increasingly important role 
in development, with the nation-state 
increasingly falling behind. For example, 
private foreign investment overtook offi-
cial development assistance, television 
programmes marginalized home-grown 
narratives around the world, and global 
consumption replaced local craftwork. 
Development, hitherto a task of the 
state, was now de-territorialized. 
Moreover, transnational value-chains 
appeared on the scene. With the end of 
the Cold War and the process of deregu-
lation in full swing, there was no obstacle 
to laying out networks of production right 
across the world. Generally speaking, 
even in the most remote corners of the 
earth, the capitalist goods and service 
economy has replaced countless subsist-
ence economies with their traditional 
markets. And capitalism had changed, 
as John Kenneth Galbraith had already 
analysed in the 1950s: from an economy 
dedicated to satisfying needs to one 
dedicated to instigating wants. 
In such an economy, what counts is 
increasingly the symbolic power of goods 
and services. What matters is what goods 
say, rather than what they do – they 
are a means of communication. Goods 
are simultaneously rituals and religion. 
Corporations spread out, and on every 
continent lifestyles aligned with one 
another: SUVs replaced rickshaws; cell-
phones superseded community gather-
ings; air-conditioning supplanted siestas. 
One can understand the globalization 
of the markets as development without 
nation-states. 
From this process, the global middle 
class – whether in Europe, North America 
and Asia or, less numerous, in South 
America and Africa – has benefited the 
most. They shop in similar malls, buy 
identical high-tech electronics, watch the 
same movies and TV series. As tourists 
they freely dispose of the decisive medium 
of alignment: money. The middle class – 
now about three billion people with an 
income of more than $10 a day – is 
growing more rapidly thanks to fast eco-
nomic growth in China, India and other 
Asian countries. 
This is in itself a historical feat: it 
probably took 150 years from the start 
of the Industrial Revolution to around 
1985 to create the first billion middle-
class consumers; the second billion took 
21 years to cross the threshold; and the 
third billion, just nine years. If the pro-
jections are correct, two billion more will 
be added to the middle class by 2028 – 
making a total of five billion people.3 On 
the lower rungs of the ladder one is able 
to afford a moped or a washing machine, 
while on the upper rungs one can invest 
in long-distance travel or real estate. 
Roughly speaking, already by the year 
2010, half of the global middle class lived 
in the Global North and the other half 
lived in the Global South. Indeed, the 
Western way of life has spread to other 
continents, spanning the entire globe. 
Without doubt this has been the terrific 
success of development – yet it is a failure 
waiting to happen.
Survival now, not progress
‘Development’ is a plastic word, an empty 
term with no positive meaning. Never-
theless, it has maintained its status of 
global perspective, because it has been 
inscribed in an international network of 
institutions from the United Nations to 
NGOs. After all, billions of people have 
made use of the ‘right to development’, 
as it was stated in a resolution of the 1986 
UN General Assembly. 
However, one can trace the remarkable 
transformation of the idea into our day. 
In 2015, for example, one could observe a 
thickening of the development discourse: 
the papal encyclical Laudato si’ in June, 
the UN Sustainable Development Goals 
in September and the Paris Agreement 
on climate change in December. Are 
these international statements still com-
mitted to development? Or can one, on 
the contrary, consider them as a proof of 
post-development thinking?
The erosion of the development idea is 
now obvious in the UN Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs). Long gone is the 
time when development meant ‘promise’. 
Back then, the talk was of young, aspiring 
nations moving along a path of progress. 
Indeed, the discourse of development 
held a monumental historical promise: 
that in the end, all societies would close 
the gap with the rich and partake in the 
fruits of industrial civilization. 
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That era is over: development is more 
often about survival now, not progress. 
The SDGs are designed to guarantee 
the minimum level of human rights 
and environmental conditions. No more 
and no less, but the sky-storming belief 
in progress has given way to the need 
for survival. The papal letter Laudato si’ 
disregards the keywords ‘development’ 
and ‘progress’, whereas the Paris climate 
deal is meant to avoid catastrophes 
and wars. 
Moreover, while the politics of fighting 
poverty has been successful in some 
places, it has been bought at the price of 
even larger inequalities elsewhere; and at 
the price of irreparable environmental 
damage. The World Inequality Report 
2018 confirmed that, since 1980, the share 
of national income going to the richest 
one per cent has increased rapidly in 
North America, China, India and Russia, 
and more moderately in Europe – 40 
years’ worth of gold rush! 
In addition, the use of the Earth is 
drastically overstretched: according to 
the calculations of the Global Footprint 
Network, humanity consumes the bio-
sphere 1.7 times over every year. Plastic 
pollution in the oceans, mass extinction 
of insects and the melting of the Arctic 
ice shield are cases in point.
Climate chaos as well as the slow 
demise of plant and animal life have cast 
doubt on the faith that developed nations 
represent the pinnacle of social evolution. 
On the contrary, progress has turned 
out to be regress, as the capitalist logic 
of the Global North cannot but exploit 
nature. From Limits to Growth in 1972 to 
Planetary Boundaries in 2009 the analysis 
is clear: development-as-growth renders 
Planet Earth inhospitable for humans. 
The SDGs – which carrying develop-
ment in their very title – are a semantic 
deception. The Sustainable Development 
Goals should really be called SSGs – Sus-
tainable Survival Goals.
The geopolitics of development 
has also imploded. At the Millennium 
Summit in New York in 2000, the pattern 
of the last 50 years was reproduced: the 
world neatly divided into North and 
South, where donors hand down capital, 
growth and social policies to beneficiary 
countries so as to recondition them for 
the global race. This pattern is a familiar 
sediment of colonial history and was, just 
like the catch-up imperative, omnipres-
ent in the post-War years. 
But by the time we reached the 
SDGs, what had happened to the idea of 
developing countries catching up with 
rich nations, this notion that was once so 
fundamental to the idea of development? 
It is worth quoting a passage in the 
document that proclaimed the SDGs: 
‘This is an agenda of unprecedented scope 
and significance. These are universal goals 
and goals which involve the entire world, 
developed and developing countries 
alike.’4 The SDGs claim to be global and 
universal, and the Paris Agreement 
followed suit. 
You cannot express the mind shift 
more clearly: the geopolitics of devel-
opment, according to which industrial 
nations would be the shining example 
for poorer countries, have been disposed 
of. All the planning and passion, the 
amount of resources and romance that 
went into realizing the dream of catching 
up! All gone.
Burying the catch-up myth 
Just as the Cold War era ended in 1989, 
the myth of catching up evaporated in 
2015. Rarely has a myth been buried so 
quietly. What point is there in develop-
ment, if there is no country that can be 
called ‘sustainably developed?’ In addi-
tion to that, the economic geography of 
the world has changed. Geopolitically 
speaking, the rapid ascension of China 
as the largest economic power on earth 
has been spectacular. The seven most 
important newly industrialized countries 
are now economically stronger than the 
traditional industrial states, although the 
G7 still pretends to be the hegemon. Glo-
balization has almost dissolved the estab-
lished North-South scheme. 
The internet provides one example. In 
2016, 3.4 billion people, half the world’s 
population, used the internet. Private 
individuals surf the web with comput-
ers, tablets or smartphones, companies 
have huge IT departments, and billions 
of people are online every day in social 
networks. The internet has become the 
‘central nervous system’ of world society. 
Incidentally, the digital infrastructure 
with its data centres requires a tremen-
dous amount of power – it accounts for 
about seven per cent of electricity con-
sumed globally.5 This corresponds to 
the annual electricity consumption of 
the UK. 
What is the geographic distribution of 
internet users? Most live in East Asia (867 
million) and South Asia (480 million); 
Western Europe (345 million) and North 
America (341 million) are in midtable.6 
Since the electricity comes mostly from 
coal, gas and oil power plants, the carbon 
footprint of all this internet activity is 
enormous. 
In short, in terms of resource con-
sumption, the upper classes in China, 
India, Malaysia and Saudi Arabia have 
already caught up with the US and 
European middle classes. By the way, in 
the international climate negotiations, 
the upper classes of the newly industri-
alized countries are relatively unscathed 
because they can hide behind the poor of 
their own nations.
Furthermore, development has always 
been a statistical construct. Without the 
magic number, GDP, it was impossible 
to come up with a ranking for nations of 
the world. Comparing income was the 
point of development thinking. Only 
in this way could the relative poverty 
or wealth of a country be determined. 
Since the 1970s, however, a dichotomy 
has emerged in the discourse of devel-
opment, juxtaposing the idea of devel-
opment-as-growth with the idea of 
development-as-social-policy. Institu-
tions such as the World Bank, the IMF 
and the WTO continued to bow to the 
idea of development-as-growth, while the 
UN Development Programme, UN Envi-
ronment Programme and most NGOs 
emphasized the idea of development-
as-social policy. Thus the term ‘develop-
ment’ became an all-purpose glue, which 
could refer to the building of airports just 
as much as to the drilling of waterholes. 
The Millennium Development Goals as 
well as the SDGs that succeeded them 
were rooted in this legacy.
Over and over again, the relationship 
between social indicators and economic 
growth has revealed itself to be a thorny 
issue. On the one hand, Agenda 2030 
(the governing statement of the SDGs) 
recognizes the decline of marine and 
terrestrial ecosystems and the increase 
in social inequality; but on the other 
hand, it calls for economic growth for the 
poorer countries of least seven per cent a 
year. The contradiction between growth 
and sustainability is said to be overcome 
by the new concepts of ‘inclusive growth’ 
and ‘green growth’. But it is now common 
knowledge that inclusive growth, driven 
by the financial markets, is an impossi-
bility because it constantly reproduces 
inequality. Typically, a decline in poverty 
goes hand in hand with spreading in-
equality. Since 1990, the emerging 
economies of Russia, China, India and 
South Africa have experienced a sharp 
rise in inequality, while in Brazil it 
has  fallen slightly, albeit from a very 
high level. 
The same applies to the slogan of green 
growth. Even at the highest echelons 
of the G7 Summits, the fact that fossil-
fuelled economic growth is not feasible 
in the medium term has done the rounds. 
In 2015, the industrialized countries 
envisaged the decarbonization of the 
global economy by the end of the century. 
However, all recipes for green growth rely 
on decoupling environmental degrada-
tion from growth, even though absolute 
decoupling (increasing growth while 
decreasing environmental degradation) 
has never been achieved in history.7 
In short, development-as-growth has 
historically become obsolete, even life-
threatening. Nevertheless, Agenda 2030 
fails to speak about prosperity without 
growth, not even for the old industrial-
ized countries. Reducing the compulsion 
for growth is apparently taboo: that 
would mean giving priority to sufficiency 
instead of efficiency in the economy. 
In an economy where the efficiency 
principle dominates, ever more things 
are produced with ever fewer resources. 
In a sufficiency economy, however, 
enough things are produced with a 
smart use of resources. Some sectors of 
the economy would shrink while others 
would grow. This design of the economy 
would imply a readiness for downscaling 
the present industrial system. Compared 
with Agenda 2030, Pope Francis in his 
encyclical Laudato si’ is more forward-
looking, given that he advocates degrowth 
for the wealthy zones of the Earth.
The unbridgeable contradiction 
Mohandas Gandhi, who led India to inde-
pendence, was a post-developmentalist 
long before the term was invented. He 
left to posterity a well-known quotation, 
which summarized his thinking about 
development succinctly: ‘The Earth has 
enough for everyone’s need, but not for 
everyone’s greed.’ 
If you look at the quote more closely, 
its subversive trait becomes clear. No 
wonder that in present-day India, Gandhi 
is viewed as a patron saint in disregard, 
only brought out on ceremonial 
occasions. Gandhi believes that the 
resources of the Earth are not scarce, 
contrary to economic orthodoxy, but 
rather abundant, certainly enough to 
satisfy the needs of human society. He 
assumes that the needs are culturally 
shaped and more or less circumscribed, 
another contrast to received economic 
wisdom. This allows him to put avarice 
in the dock because systemic greed 
undermines the needs of the majority of 
people. Greed is the variable that decides 
if people have enough to live on or not.
If the authors of the report of the 
Brundtland Commission, in 1987, had 
read their Gandhi accurately, they 
would not have come up with the classic 
definition of sustainable development: 
‘The development meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their 
own needs.’ Gandhi would have insisted 
that not all needs are equally valid, that 
the needs of the well-to-do would be 
different from those of the underprivi-
leged. Thus, in the aftermath, the lack of 
distinction between survival needs and 
luxury needs has become a pitfall of the 
debate on sustainability.
In fact, lumping together human 
rights and consumer rights is the legacy 
of the concept of development, which is 
blind to class relations. How can one treat 
the basic social rights to food, housing 
and health as being at the same level as 
the consumer demand for SUVs, real 
estate and stocks? What do the Mapuche 
in southern Chile have in common with 
the Wall Street bankers, or the cotton 
workers in Mali with the start-ups in 
Shanghai? Not much, except that they are 
united in the mirage of development. 
But this opens up a dilemma that has 
always remained hidden in the illusion 
of development. A recent study confirms 
that, under the current development 
model, there is an unbridgeable contra-
diction between the social and environ-
mental goals of the SDGs.8 In relatively 
wealthy countries where the physical 
SDGs (poverty, nutrition, health, energy) 
are reasonably satisfied – as in Europe, 
North America, Japan, Argentina, Chile, 
Thailand and the like – there is an 
ecological problem of huge magnitude. 
They are all crossing the planetary 
boundaries, as in the emission of CO2 
and nitrogen, and the consumption of 
phosphorus and freshwater. 
Conversely, where countries remain 
within their environmental frameworks, 
the physical SDGs are largely unfulfilled. 
Roughly, the double-bind is this: the 
higher the standard of living of a country 
rises, the more the biosphere tends to be 
68 69NEW INTERNATIONALIST JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2020
The age of developmentTHE LONG READ
degraded. And conversely, the less social 
human rights are guaranteed, the smaller 
the ecological footprint tends to be, at 
least in terms of carbon and materials. 
What a tragic result of development!
What weighs more heavily, moreover, 
is the fact that sometimes the wellbeing 
of the global middle class depends on the 
poverty of others. There are plenty of 
examples: local fisherfolk lose out when 
large factory ships empty the oceans; 
smallholders are displaced when agricul-
tural corporations massively buy up land; 
slum-dwellers have to give way when 
city highways are built; long-established 
residents are evicted when gentrification 
reaches their neighbourhoods; workers 
are subjected to repression if they want 
to exercise their trade-union rights in 
factories in the global value chain. 
In short, the imperial mode of living 
often penetrates deeply into the lifestyles, 
institutions and infrastructure of the 
global middle class.9 Unrecognized and 
yet highly effective through a variety of 
complex economic structures and exploi-
tation mechanisms, the overall result is 
dramatic: the well-to-do are living at the 
expense of the poor.
Fear of the future
To draw out the essence of Agenda 2030, 
the encyclical Laudato si’ and the Paris 
Agreement, one point stands out: the 
development enthusiasm of the 20th 
century is gone. In its place, the demise 
of expansive modernity has been 
moving to centre stage. The motto of the 
previous century (playing on the words 
of the Lord’s Prayer), ‘on Earth as in 
the West’, now seems like a threat. The 
world appears to be in disarray; chaos, 
fear and anger are widespread, contrast-
ing sharply with the triumphalism of 
the 1990s. The rise of China, the decline 
of the West, the hegemony of the finan-
cial markets, the return of authoritarian 
states: all of these may serve as exam-
ples of the vagaries of contemporary 
history. 
If one had to find a phrase summing 
up the current atmosphere in the Global 
North, as well as parts of the Global 
South, it would be: fear of the future. 
There is a fear that life prospects are 
shrinking and that children and grand-
children will be less well-off than their 
parents and grandparents. A suspicion is 
spreading within the global middle class 
that the expectations kindled by develop-
ment are not going to be fulfilled. 
The middle classes in formerly rich 
countries, thinned out by globalization, 
now call for protection and security. 
At the same time, large parts of the 
population in the emerging countries, 
alienated from their traditions, aware of 
Western lifestyles through their smart-
phones, yet excluded from the modern 
world, are resorting to nationalistic pride. 
Everywhere there is a huge polariza-
tion between rich and poor. However, 
while in the nation-states of yesteryear 
the losers were still capable of demanding 
corrections from the winners, they are 
no longer able to do so in times of glo-
balization. The transnational economy, 
especially the financial sector, triumphs 
over the living conditions of each 
country. In response, national populism 
has emerged – with its many facets. 
Facing the turbulences of today’s 
world, framing social problems as ‘devel-
opment problems’ is strangely outdated. 
If everything is not misleading, three 
narratives of social transformation can 
be identified: the narratives of fortress, 
globalism and solidarity. 
Fortress thinking expressed through 
national populism revives the glorious 
past of an imagined people. Authoritar-
ian leaders bring back pride, while others 
are scapegoated – from Muslims to the 
UN. This leads to hatred of foreigners, 
sometimes coupled with religious funda-
mentalism. A kind of ‘affluence chauvin-
ism’ is widespread, in particular amongst 
the middle classes whose material goods 
need to be defended against the poor. 
Moreover, national populists have 
nothing but contempt for ecology. They 
welcome drilling for oil in the sea, frack-
ing, coalmining and deforestation. 
They consider climate change to be a 
finely woven list of the enemies of the 
national economy. They are so backward 
looking that they glorify the plundering 
of nature. Except for their xenophobia, 
they could be considered as revenants of 
the developmental ideology of the 1950s. 
This adds to the anachronism of national 
populism.
In contrast, the narrative of globalism 
revolves around the image of the planet 
as an archetypal symbol. Instead of the 
fortress mercantilism of ‘America First’, 
globalists promote an ideally deregulated, 
free-trade world, which is meant to bring 
wealth and wellbeing to corporations 
and consumers. The globalists, however, 
consider the present economic system 
unsustainable. Compared with the politics 
of neoliberalism, they give more space 
for public investments, more reforms 
of the social sector, and generally more 
leadership of public policy. Above all, 
they strive for economic growth within 
the framework of a ‘green economy’. 
The globalized elite may worry about 
the future, but such difficulties can 
seemingly be overcome with inclusive 
growth, smart technologies and environ-
mental guidelines for market forces. To a 
large extent, the UN Agenda 2030, with 
its Sustainable Development Goals, fits 
into this frame of thought.
The narrative of solidarity is different. 
The eco-social ethic stands in opposi-
tion to fortress thinking as well as to the 
narrative of globalism. It foresees a post-
capitalist era, based on a cultural shift 
toward eco-solidarity. The economic 
monoculture, which reigns in large parts 
of the world, would make room for civili-
zational alternatives, be it the worldview 
of Ubuntu or Buen vivir, be it European 
humanism or community spirit.10 
In the mindset of solidarity, human 
rights – collective and individual – and 
ecological principles are valued highly; 
market forces are seen not as an end in 
themselves, but as a means to an end. The 
politics of solidarity promotes a cultural 
rather than technical change, under-
pinned by co-operative economic forms 
and public-welfare policies. In contrast 
to globalism, the narrative of solidar-
ity pleads for permeable but no open 
borders, imposing certain conditions for 
migrants, commodities and capital, just 
as a membrane of a living cell. 
Furthermore, as expressed in the 
slogan ‘think globally, act locally’, a cos-
mopolitan localism is nurtured whereby 
local politics must also take into account 
the needs of the transnational commu-
nity. This means quitting the imperial 
way of life that industrial civilization 
demands, leaving land, food and capital 
in the hands of the Global South. Particu-
larly in the face of ecological collapse, it is 
imperative, in the North as well as in the 
South, to phase out the economic system 
based on fossil resources, supplanting 
it with an economic system based on 
biodiversity. 
This transition implies wind as well as 
solar power to provide energy and regen-
erative agriculture to provide food and 
fibre. Instead of expansive modernity it 
is time for reductive modernity: green 
enterprises, zero-emissions housing, 
much lower amounts (by European 
standards) of motorized traffic, much less 
consumption of meat, and generally less 
ownership and more sharing. And finally, 
new forms of frugal prosperity are called 
for: affluence of time instead of affluence 
of goods; labour of care instead of wage 
labour; partaking in nature instead of 
taking part in the rat race.
As we confront the fear of the future, 
the basic direction of politics is at stake; 
this paradigmatic dispute will be on the 
agenda for decades to come. Thus, devel-
opment, like monarchy or feudalism, 
is about to move further and further 
into the haze of history, of interest only 
for students and scholars. Shaping our 
destiny beyond development is the task 
that lies ahead of us. l
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